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THE EVOLUTION OF ETHICS

Human Sociality and the Emergence
of Ethical Mindedness

BLAINE J. FOWERS



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The Evolution of Ethics

Human Sociality and the Emergence of Ethical Mindedness

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Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	ix
<i>Preface and Acknowledgements</i>	xi
Part I Evolved Human Nature	1
Introduction	3
1 Flourishing and the Function Argument	19
2 Evolved Human Nature	42
Part II Human Sociality	65
3 Attachment and Friendship	67
4 Intersubjectivity and Identity	95
5 Imitation and the Intricacies of Knowledge	131
6 Cooperation, Trust, and Justice	162
7 The Expanding Cultural World, Harmony, and Belonging	198
8 The Most Political Animals and Shared Identity	234
9 Conflict, Hierarchy, Social Order, and Status	267
Part III Conclusion	305
10 An Aristotelian Theory of Natural Ethics	307
<i>Notes</i>	345
<i>References</i>	348
<i>Index</i>	379

8

The Most Political Animals and Shared Identity

A brief recounting of the complex social capacities I have discussed so far suggests that Aristotle likely had it right in the *Politics* when he famously said that “man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals” (1253a 8–9). We see this political readiness in many ways. Humans are strongly interested in others’ faces and emotions from the first hours of life, and we are deeply oriented toward attachment to other humans. We are “imitation machines,” replicating actions necessary to achieve an outcome but also actions we perceive as intentionally normative. We come to recognize ourselves as separate independent agents, but this appears to be secondary to our ability to see others as independent actors with their own beliefs, emotions, and intentions. We are able to pursue independent goals, but we also pursue joint goals with shared intentionality. We are prolific, highly engaged cooperators. We punish cheaters without direct benefit to us as punishers, only a group benefit that the punisher shares. Cooperation can be directed toward individual benefit, but cooperative activities are also choiceworthy in themselves. We can self-reflect, but we do so frequently in terms of the norms and expectations of our group. Language deepens and enriches all of these activities.

Although these capacities are incomplete until adulthood, rudimentary forms are in place long before children are capable of intentionally cultivating them. The extent and expense of these social adaptations—necessitating the extreme degree of human altricity—suggest an evolutionary priority on preparing humans to be adept social actors well before we can be fully independent agents.

The intensity of human sociality is apparent not just in the extent of our social coordination but also in our profound dependence on our intimates and groups for our psychological and physical health, learning, culture, and to know who we are. Chapter 7 made it clear that group membership is vital because belonging is so important. We will see in this chapter that belonging is just the beginning of how important groups are for humans because group membership is integral to one’s identity. The deck is thoroughly stacked to promote intragroup cooperation, mutual support, mutual identification,

and cohesion. These adaptations promote a collective form of identity as a group member. This collective identity is remarkably easy to induce, and yet it powerfully shapes our emotions, cognitions, and actions. The function argument suggests that because collective identity is such an important part of our nature, it is a central element in human flourishing.

My focus now shifts from ingroup relations to the powerful influence of ingroup/outgroup dynamics on identity and social relations. As I discuss the essential role that collective identity has for human beings, it is important to recall that collective identity contradicts the ideology of individualism. Individualism holds that the individual is the basic social reality and that humans are separate individuals that can and ought to act independently for our own self-interest. Individualism therefore takes relationships and group membership as secondary to and derivative of individual identity. We will see how thoroughly collective identity shows that this prominent cultural viewpoint is inconsistent with what we know about human sociality.

Group Membership and Collective Identity

The existence of ongoing, cohesive, mutually recognized human groups is dependent on two essential capacities. The first is social categorization—the ability to quickly and reliably recognize who is a member of which group. The second is collective identity—the strong inclination to identify oneself as a member of the group and to take on the group’s interests as one’s own. That is, group interests are as fundamental to human beings as individual interests.

Although individual and group interests are often harmonious, deeply compelling conflicts can arise between individual and group interests. The struggle to manage such conflicts demonstrates that both individual and collective identities are vital to human nature. If unchecked, these conflicts can be individually paralyzing, or they can give rise to interpersonal or factional conflict and violence, topics for Chapter 9. This motivational tension is just the kind of persistent problem for which adaptations are selected. We have already encountered two group-favoring heuristics in the establishment and maintenance of group norms and the avoidance of ostracism in Chapter 7. The next sections of this chapter explore four additional heuristics that assist individuals in managing tensions between individual and group interests. First, the social categorization heuristic makes it possible to identify whose interests should be of concern to the individual. Second, the activation of the collective-identity heuristic prioritizes group interests over individual interests. The third heuristic is favoritism toward one’s ingroup and toward ingroup members that motivates individuals to value and help ingroup members. The fourth is a loyalty heuristic that fosters ongoing commitment to the group.

Social Categorization

Categorization may be one of the most basic cognitive processes, and social groups amount to categories of people (Hogg, 2004). Social categorization works just like other forms of categorization, but, as we will see, social categorization is also central to the categorizer's identity, which brings us to social identity and social categorization theories.

Both social identity (Tajfel, 1981) and social categorization theorists (Hogg, 2004) suggest that individuals organize their interpretations of and interactions with their social world through categorizing social actors. Hogg reviewed an extensive literature indicating that social categorization heuristics are simple, fast, and automatic, with four characteristic features. First, categorization selects important differences to highlight and unimportant ones to deemphasize. For example, strong differences include group membership and perceptions of honesty. Second, social categorizations implicate the self because they always focus on the relationship between the categorized other and the self. Third, categorization emphasizes differences between categories and similarities within categories (Tajfel; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Because both the self and others are categorized and homogenized within groups, this process is referred to as depersonalization. Diminishing within-group differences is a kind of self-stereotyping that has the effect of depersonalizing the actor, thereby fostering a collective identity (Brewer, 2008a). Finally, Hogg suggested that "social categorization . . . produces ingroup identification, a sense of belonging, self-definition in group terms, and ingroup loyalty and favoritism" (p. 209).

As Brewer and Yuki (2007) explained, social categorization creates a repetitively activated division of the social world into ingroups and outgroups. This differentiation is accompanied by a positive disposition toward ingroup members that includes trust, liking, empathy, and cooperative inclinations, coupled with wariness toward outgroup members. Tajfel (1981) defined a collective identity¹ as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group . . . together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (p. 255). Collective identity is self-defining because individuals' cognition, action, and behavior are essential to identifying one as a group member (Ashmore et al., 2004), and it is mutually defining because an individual's membership in the group must also be acknowledged by other group members.

Crucially, identity is defined through difference. That is, in order to know who I am, I have to contrast myself to others. To know who we are as a group requires an understanding of how our group differs from other groups. Without such contrasts, identity would be impossible because the individual and the group would be undifferentiated. This means that identifying oneself with a band, a club, or a profession would come with attributions of traits, abilities, or interests perceived as common within the group and contrasted with features perceived as common in outgroup individuals.

Psychologists test for this tendency to differentiate by examining the relative accessibility of information about the ingroup and outgroup. Investigators ask research participants to make similarity and dissimilarity judgments, and the lengths of time it takes them to respond indicates the relative accessibility of this information. Characteristics that group members share should be more accessible, as shown by faster response times. For example, Smith and Henry (1996) found that when the collective identities of college major or fraternity membership were made salient, college students identified self-descriptive traits that matched the traits for the ingroup faster than those that mismatched the ingroup.

Brewer and Gardner (1996) examined the differential accessibility of information under different identity conditions. In two experiments, they primed research participants with *we/us* or *they/them* pronouns prior to a task in which participants judged attitudes as similar or dissimilar to their own attitudes. Following the authors' expectations, participants made similarity judgments more quickly in the *we/us* condition and dissimilarity judgments more quickly in the *they/them* condition.

Scores of studies have used the minimal group paradigm to study social categorization (e.g., De Cremer & van Dijk, 2002). In these randomized experiments, relationship status and group membership are created among a group of strangers with a very simple manipulation. It is called the minimal group paradigm because group identity is rapidly formed through minimal cues such as highlighting that students are majors in the same academic department or groups ostensibly based on liking the same type of painting (Tajfel, 1981). These studies do not include long-term relationships or members of the actual groups that have formed the individual's identity. This means that social identities are incredibly easy to activate. This is just the sort of rapid, automatic, and powerful response that dedicated cognitive architecture produces. I discuss research that is specific to each of the three remaining heuristics in the following sections, but this evidence documents the activity of social categorization as well.

Collective Identity

Brewer and her colleagues (e.g., Brewer & Caporael, 2006) developed a theory of the extended or collective self to account for extensive evidence that individual identity is partly constituted by group membership. Brewer (1991) called into question much psychological and philosophical theorizing, wherein the individual is seen as the fundamental social reality, with group memberships amounting to affiliations or alliances undertaken for individual advantage. In contrast, they suggested that collective identity is frequently prepotent, providing ingroup inclusiveness and differentiation from outgroups. Brewer and Caporael's work suggests that individual identity is shaped and supported throughout life by identification with four levels of social configurations: dyads, small task groups (5–10 people), bands

(25–30 people), and larger macroband or tribal groups. In the first three configurations, the relationships are personalized, with extensive face-to-face interaction, whereas the larger macroband configuration involves impersonal relatedness such as that found in ethnic group membership.

Brewer and Gardner (1996) noted that many social psychological theories recognize a distinction between a personal identity or self (that differentiates one from all others) and a collective identity or self (that reflects assimilation to a group and differentiates ingroup and outgroup members). These theories include the dyad, task group, and band configurations. Individual identity is initially forged in the face-to-face interactions in prototypical relationships of caregiver-child, friendships, pair bonds, and small, face-to-face groups such as families or foraging groups. Recall from Chapters 3–5 that individual identity is defined in the parent-child relationship and as being a group member before it is defined in terms of being a unique person. Thus, one's personal identity unavoidably includes others, which is one element of what Brewer and Gardner called the expanded self.

The theory of the expanded self adds to the standard social psychology conception of identity in two ways (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). First, the social world is divided into the social configurations (dyad, work group, and band) that depend on personal relationships with specific individuals and the social configuration (macroband) that relies on "larger, more impersonal collectives or social categories" (p. 83). Impersonal collective identity is not focused on direct personal relationships because it involves being a member of a category such as a tribe, a profession, or a die-hard fan of a sports team. Macroband membership is also more symbolically derived. Caporael (1997) explained that large group collective identity is maintained through "common origin stories, customs, ritual, and most enduringly, language" (p. 286). Similar forms of dress, shared language or dialect, and other symbolic tokens facilitate recognition of macroband members. That is, these larger groups are held together through cultural meanings and practices.

Second, Brewer and Gardner (1996) insisted that collective identity partly constitutes individual identity, rather than being an add-on to an already self-sufficient individual. For these authors, collective identity involves "a depersonalized sense of self" (p. 83), wherein the emphasis is on being a member of a social category more than on being a unique individual. That is, when the collective identity is activated, it is prioritized over the individual identity.

Brewer and Gardner (1996) emphasized that the distinction between personalized and depersonalized collective identities is a matter of how broadly inclusive the attachments are because both forms of identity involve the entire person, with strong cognitive, affective, and behavioral components. Collective identity, particularly as afforded through language, enables highly coordinated behavior over significant time periods. Including others in one's self-concept through the extended self makes social processes such as trust,

cooperation, resource sharing, sacrifice, forgiveness, and accommodation more likely and more encompassing (Brewer, 1991; Maner et al., 2002).

Membership in groups is not simply a strategy to obtain benefits. From this perspective, there is no independent self that stands apart from all group affiliations and decides which affiliations are most to one's advantage. In the EEA, individuals belonged to a primary group throughout their lives. Although migration to other bands was always possible and sometimes occurred, this was a matter of moving from one band to another, not achieving independence from all bands. The contemporary world, with ultra-large societies and high degree of mobility, can give us the illusion of an independent self and of the possibility of an entirely self-generated identity. A key insight of an evolutionary perspective is that individual identity is inextricable from membership in groups, meaning that significant aspects of one's identity are defined by specific group memberships.

If humans evolved to have individual and collective levels of identity, this differentiation should show up in affect, cognition, and behavior. These identities would not be just an internal representation, appearing only in the mind and viscera of the individual. Rather, they would manifest clearly in coordinated behavior oriented to tangible goals and persisting through time. Moreover, collective identity would be a shared achievement of individuals bound together by mutual and observable identification.

Differential motives for action are key elements of the forms of identity because "when the definition of the self changes, the meaning of self-interest and self-serving motivation also changes accordingly" (Brewer, 1991, p. 476). Individuals frequently act straightforwardly for the sake of their individual benefit, but individuals also act to benefit their groups. The extended self model suggests that individuals can act jointly with others for mutual benefits or unilaterally to benefit their relationship partners or their groups. There is substantial empirical support for the influence of the collective self on cognition, affect, and behavior in social groups from dyads (e.g., Brewer, 2008b) to larger collectives (e.g., De Cremer & van Dijk, 2002). Individuals act in systematically different ways, depending on whether an individual or collective identity is evoked (Caporael et al., 1989). For example, when a collective identity is activated, individuals will sacrifice resources for the benefit of the group, but they will be disinclined to do so if they are acting as individuals (De Cremer & van Dijk, 2002). Similarly, individuals with an activated collective identity tend to remain loyal to a group, even against their individual interest, whereas those acting as individuals tend to leave the disadvantageous group (van Vugt & Hart, 2004).

Collective identity goes beyond affiliation and trust because identifying with a group means that the interests of the groups to which we belong are just as basic to humans as self-interest. This merging of self-interest and group-interest is the full meaning of the idea of the collective self. Indeed, "when social identification is strong, contributing to the group welfare is

an end in itself, independent of what benefits ultimately accrue to the self" (Brewer, 2008a, p. 223). This suggests that pure self-interest is an abstraction with little meaning because humans are frequently motivated largely or entirely by group interests, and self-interest is always identified and expressed in the context of collective interests.

Brewer and Caporael (2006) suggested that both self-oriented and group-oriented motivations are always present for human beings and that behavior is not consistently egocentric or group-centric. The tension and balance between these two forms of motivation are generally resolved by the activation of the individual or collective identity. For example, laboratory studies indicate that, in conditions of scarcity, when no social identification is salient, individuals tend to increase their individual resource use, but when a social identification is activated, they tend to reduce their resource use for the benefit of the group (De Cremer & van Dijk, 2002; De Cremer & van Vugt, 1999). These studies used the minimal group paradigm, meaning that collective identity was artificially and minimally induced, yet it powerfully influenced behavior.

The extended self-concept provides an elegant resolution of the longstanding egoism/altruism debate. Batson (2011) has, through a sustained program of research, contested the standard view that human motivation is fundamentally egoistic. Using multiple paradigms, he has found support for his empathy-altruism hypothesis: that helping another person is reliably predicted by having empathy for that person. Other scholars have argued for the exclusiveness of self-interest in human action by explaining that "altruism" is ultimately egoistically motivated (e.g., Bar Tal, Sharabany, & Raviv, 1982).

Yet a proper understanding of the intensity of human sociality raises questions about the egoism/altruism distinction. For example, two sets of studies have explicitly examined whether it is empathy or the perception of common identity that promotes helping behavior (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; Maner et al., 2002). When merged identity and empathy are both activated, only merged identity predicts helping behavior, suggesting that the relationship between empathy and helping is spurious. As Cialdini et al. pointed out, "if self and other are not sharply distinct in a helper's mind, it is not possible to separate egoism from altruism in a helper's mind. After all, as the self and other increasingly merge, helping the other increasingly helps the self . . . when the distinction between self and other is undermined, the traditional dichotomy between selfishness and selflessness loses its meaning" (p. 490). This conclusion is amplified by the concepts of the extended self and the intersubjectivity of the mirror neuron system discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, which suggest that self-other boundaries are perpetually fluid and that common interests with others in dyads, small groups, and large groups abound in human life.

The complement to blurred boundaries between the individual and the group is that individuals must have a distinctive identity within the group.

Even this individually distinctive identity is socially constituted because it can only arise as the individual differentiates himself from ingroup others. Brewer's (1991) theory of optimal distinctiveness recognizes the importance of belonging to the group and individual distinctiveness in the group. Inclusion in the group is achieved through adopting the group identity, norm following, and pursuing group interests. Distinctiveness is a matter of highlighting personal identity in ways that distinguish one from others in the group.

There are substantial fitness advantages to many forms of distinctiveness, with two broad categories. The first are status advantages. There are many capacities that could set one apart as a valued member of a group, such as skills for navigating landscapes, finding water, hunting prowess, or fostering reconciliation following conflict. To the degree that such capacities are valued, they confer prestige status. (See Chapter 9.) The second category of distinctiveness is irreplaceability. One can be irreplaceable to the group due to any of the capacities just noted, and irreplaceability would then be based on valued capacities. Irreplaceability can also take the form of deep friendship, as discussed in Chapter 3. Belonging to a group and being a distinctive member of the group are complementary interests.

Although the development of a distinctive individual identity is partly a matter of differentiation, it is essential to remember that individual identity is impossible without the group from which one distinguishes oneself or without the co-creation of identity through interactions with other group members. Individual identity arises through identifying or creating differences from others that make one unique in important ways *within* the group, and the shape and contours of that uniqueness are negotiated over time with others in the group. For example, one's skill in navigating terrain is only valuable when recognized by others, and this distinctiveness is conferred through social behavior when others follow the navigator's lead. I turn now to the third heuristic that puts individual identity in its context: ingroup favoritism.

Ingroup Favoritism

There is a large literature on the interindividual–intergroup discontinuity documenting that interpersonal situations tend to activate individual identity, and situations that highlight group membership tend to activate collective identity. Evidence has accumulated that, compared to one-to-one interactions, in situations involving intergroup interaction, people behave more competitively (Cohen et al., 2006; Morgan & Tindale, 2002; Wildschut, Vevea, Pinter, Insko, & Schopler, 2003), less cooperatively, less effectively (Insko et al., 1987), more aggressively (Meier & Hinsz, 2004), with less perceived responsibility (Meier & Hinsz, 2004), and with greater concern for maximizing one's own group's outcomes (Cohen et al., 2006). People in groups expect less cooperation from other groups (Insko, Kirchner, Pinter,

Efaw, & Wildschut, 2005) and are more distrustful of other groups compared to interacting individuals (Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, & Graetz, 1990). These collective identity effects, like those discussed above, emerged in the minimal group paradigm.

In contrast, individuals respond to ingroup members with trust and cooperation. One paradigm for studying the influence of group identification is a public goods game (PGG). PGGs provide another test for the common assumption that human motivation is foundationally egoistic and personal-gain maximizing. A participant can maximize his outcome in PGGs by refusing to contribute to the public good. To the extent that individuals contribute to the public good, they are acting on behalf of the group. Contributors also can benefit from the public good (if enough others contribute, too), but it is always less than if they focused only on maximizing their individual outcomes.

De Cremer and van Vugt (1999) contrasted two collective-self hypotheses. Their goal transformation hypothesis suggests that collective identification transforms group interest into individual interest. Their trust hypothesis suggested that activating collective identity increases trust because ingroup individuals are seen as more trustworthy and honest. In the PGG, trust would increase confidence that contributions to the public good would successfully produce the public good because others could be trusted to contribute. In three experiments, De Cremer and van Vugt found that contributions were influenced by goal transformation rather than trust enhancement, suggesting that collective identity activation alone is sufficient to encourage group-benefitting action, and such action does not require viewing individuals as personally trustworthy. This recalls Brewer's (2008a) concept of depersonalization because collective identity is depersonalizing.

De Cremer and van Dijk (2002) activated collective identity in an iterated PGG wherein participants received feedback about the group's performance. In this study, groups of seven participants each received 300 cents. If the group as a whole contributed 1050 or more cents (half of the collective endowment), the experimenter would double the amount contributed by the participants and divide it equally among them. If the total amount contributed to the group was less than 1050 cents, the contributed money would be forfeited. There were two experimental manipulations. First, the experimenters activated group identity for half the participants with no group identifier for the other condition. Second, half the participants were told they met the contribution requirement in the first trial, and half were told they failed to meet it. Participants were randomly assigned to these conditions. Following the feedback, they were given a second trial.

De Cremer and van Dijk (2002) predicted that participants in the activated group identity condition would contribute more in the first trial than individual identity participants (prior to feedback on the group's success) and that they would increase their contributions following failure feedback, whereas those in the individual identity condition would not increase their

contributions following failure feedback. In the no group identity condition, participants had lower initial contributions, and they reduced their contributions to the public good following failure feedback. Group failure motivated these participants to be more egocentric in their allocation. In contrast, individuals in the group identity condition increased their contributions following failure feedback. This clear behavioral divergence to failure feedback indicates that collective identity is sufficient to induce people to allocate even more resources to a struggling group rather than cut their losses. It also shows that both individual and collective identity affect individuals' action.

Kramer and Brewer (1984) conducted studies with the replenishable resource paradigm, a variation of the PGG, in which participants were allowed to withdraw money from a pool that is slowly replenished. If participants withdraw money at a high rate, the pool is depleted, but if they withdraw resources at a low rate, the pool will remain viable through replenishment. Participants chose between maximizing their individual outcome by withdrawing the maximum from the pool or keeping their withdrawals low to maintain the resource pool. Participants were formed into groups of six, with three people at one site and three people at a second site. They were randomly assigned to two manipulations. In the superordinate group condition, participants were told that the resource usage of the six people in their group was being compared with responses in other communities. In this condition, the group identity corresponds to access to the common resource. In the subordinate group condition, they were told that the responses of the subgroups of three individuals in each location were being compared with each other. In this condition, the group identity does not correspond to access to the resource because outgroup members also have access to it. The second manipulation was that half the participants were told the resource pool was being depleted by the group, and half the participants were told the resource pool was being used at a sustainable level. Participants in the superordinate group condition reduced their individual withdrawals from the resource pool following depletion feedback. In contrast, individuals in the subordinate group condition increased their withdrawals following depletion feedback. These contrasting results indicate that the activation of individual or collective identities produced opposite responses to the depletion situation, where the greatest conflict between individual and group interests arises.

Tanis and Postmes (2005) studied how group identity facilitates ingroup cooperation by studying the bases for trust. They conducted a trust or investment game experiment in which participants were given a sum of money that they could keep or give to a counterpart. If they gave it to the other person, the researcher would triple it and then the counterpart could decide how much of the total to return to the participant. They had group and individual identity conditions and provided half the participants with identity cues about their counterpart (a bogus portrait picture and first name). They replicated the standard difference in greater behavioral trust toward ingroup

than outgroup individuals. Tanis and Postmes found that trusting behavior emerged through two pathways. Participants trusted partners based on individual identity cues if available. In the absence of those cues, trust was stronger toward ingroup members. Expectations of reciprocity mediated the relationship between group membership and trust in all conditions. These results indicate that trust can be based either on knowledge about a particular person or, in the absence of that knowledge, simply knowing that the other person is an ingroup member. Both situations prompt expectations of reciprocity that lead to trusting behavior.

Prisoner's dilemma games (PDGs) give participants the opportunity to cooperate with or cheat a partner. Defecting provides the best immediate individual payoff, but cooperating provides the best overall joint payoff. PDGs are generally studied in iterated form, and cooperation is common because players quickly recognize that defections are reciprocated by the other player. To eliminate this incentive for cooperation, some studies' investigators only allow participants to play one time against a partner, known as a one-shot game.

In a series of one-shot PDGs, Yamagishi and his colleagues (Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000) produced findings that parallel those in the public goods, resource, and trust games already discussed. They manipulated expectations of reciprocity in two ways. Half the participants were given a minimal group identity and half were not. Half the participants played a simultaneous PDG, and half played a sequential game. A sequential PDG is one in which participant A makes a decision, and player B makes a decision with full information of A's decision to cooperate or defect. Because A knows this arrangement, A is more likely to cooperate, with the expectation that this show of good faith will elicit reciprocation from B. Cooperation was high in the sequential game in both membership conditions because player B was generally responding to A's cooperation. The membership manipulation also increased participants' cooperation, but only in the simultaneous game, where individuals have to trust without knowledge of what the other player would do. These results confirmed the cooperation pathways through personalized and depersonalized trust. They pointed out that, in personalized trust, the exchange of benefits is a direct and mutual form of personal reciprocity. In depersonalized trust, this exchange is more generalized in that an individual expects benefits because the game partner is a group member. The studies by Tanis and Postmes and Yamagishi and his colleagues illustrate the effects of depersonalized trust particularly well because there was no opportunity for future reciprocity.

There are also individual differences in investment in group interests, which has been termed "social orientation" (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). Researchers have studied social orientation with a decomposed games procedure that resembles a Dictator game (where one individual unilaterally determines outcomes). They present respondents with nine questions about how they would distribute points between themselves and another participant in the study. Each question has three parallel choices for points. An example is:

	A	B	C
You (the participant) get	500	560	500
The other gets	500	300	100

Choice A is defined as prosocial because the participant chooses an equal outcome for self and other. Choice B is called individualistic because it has the highest outcome for the self, with a moderate outcome for the other. Choice C is seen as competitive because it has the greatest discrepancy in outcomes between the self and the other. An individual's social orientation is identified as one of these three types if he elects the same response type six or more times. Researchers have consistently found that the majority of respondents have a prosocial orientation, with about 30 percent having an individualistic orientation and about 10 percent indicating a competitive orientation (De Cremer & van Dijk, 2002; Van Lange et al., 1997). Van Lange et al. found that these responses were related to attachment security but not to social desirability. The prevalence of prosocial orientation again suggests that the common assumption of fundamentally egoistic human motivation is often dramatically overstated. By themselves, these findings are not particularly compelling because they are self-report responses without real-world outcomes. Nevertheless, as we saw in the previous two chapters, prosocial or cooperative motives are very strong for most individuals, although a minority of people does not cooperate by default.

In three studies that examined behavioral outcomes in one-shot PGGs, De Cremer and van Vugt (1999) replicated the result that minimal group identification increased contributions to the public good. They expected participants with individualistic and competitive social orientations to contribute more to the public good in the collective identity condition than in the individual identity condition, and this prediction was confirmed. They did not expect collective identity activation to influence contributions of prosocial individuals because prosocials' contributions are very high without collective identity. They interpreted these results in terms of goal transformation, in which individualistic and competitive participants identified the group's interest with their own interest in the collective identity condition. In other words, collective identity moderated the individualistic and competitive inclinations to pursue self-interest at the expense of the group. Taken together, these studies show very consistent ingroup favoritism effects and that there are two pathways to cooperation: personal and impersonal trust.

Loyalty

Studies comparing interpersonal and intergroup behavior tend to focus on trust, cooperation, competition, and hostility. Van Vugt and Hart (2004) pointed out that maintaining group integrity is another important problem

for groups. Loyalty is one potential solution, and it has been defined in various ways that include adherence to ingroup norms, staying in a group, working for the benefit of the group, and providing these group benefits at some cost to oneself (van Vugt & Hart, 2004; Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001).

Van Vugt and Hart (2004) conducted several studies on whether collective identity promoted loyalty to the group. They used a social dilemma paradigm wherein participants could remain in a relatively unsuccessful group or act as independent individuals with better prospects of monetary success. They activated collective identity with a minimal group paradigm for half their participants. Participants in the collective identity condition were less likely to leave unsuccessful groups even when it was in their self-interest to do so, which the authors interpreted as loyalty because staying with the group was costly. They also found that participants in the collective identity condition felt more affective loyalty to the group and loyally attributed the group's failure to more external and unstable causes than those in the individual identity condition did. The more participants invested in the group, the higher their loyalty, but the investment effect and the collective identity effect were independent, meaning that group loyalty could arise from greater investment or from collective identification.

Van Vugt and Hart (2004) also examined whether members stayed in the group because others did. They manipulated the participants' perception about other group members staying in the group. If more people were thought to leave, the participant may be more likely to leave because the loyalty norm is being violated. There was no evidence that such a norm was in effect in their studies. They concluded that "collective identity acts as social glue by holding groups together that would normally collapse due to a shortage of resources" (p. 594).

Zdaniuk and Levine (2001) similarly found that individuals in a collective identity condition were more likely than those in an individual identity condition to remain in a group when it was disadvantageous. The social identifiers who did leave their groups found the decision more stressful and saw themselves as less moral than social identifiers who stayed in the group. Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (1997) also found that social identifiers are more inclined to remain in a group, even when disadvantageous. They reported evidence suggesting that the relationship between ingroup identification and inclination to leave the group is mediated by commitment to the group.

Ingroup loyalty can play an important role in inclusive fitness in several ways. Influencing others to benefit the group or members of the group will improve one's fitness, so it would be in the individual's interest to induce group loyalty to the greatest extent possible. Four important ways to do this are through attachment bonds, particularly friendships (Chapter 3), ongoing cooperation (Chapter 6), the development and enforcement of group norms (Chapter 7), and through the threat of ostracism (Chapter 7). These ways to induce loyalty are ubiquitous and powerful.

Cohen et al. (2006) suggested that the differences between interpersonal and intergroup behavior are suggestive of two different moralities, with interpersonal behavior oriented more toward facilitating cooperation and fairness and intergroup behavior oriented more to serving the group's interest. They found that loyalty to the ingroup decreased the acceptability of violence toward ingroup members and increased the acceptability of violence toward outgroup members. The intriguing possibility of distinct forms of morality for interpersonal and intergroup situations is important because it suggests that these two forms of morality evolved somewhat independently, serve different functions, and may not always operate harmoniously (more on this in Chapter 10).

Outgroup Relations

There is a common assumption that ingroup favoritism and outgroup negativity are two sides of the same coin (Kurzban & Leary, 2001; van Vugt & Park, 2010). In contrast, Brewer (2007) discussed extensive evidence indicating that identification with and favoritism toward one's ingroup is independent of negativity toward outgroups. This suggests that the evolution of collective identity was an adaptation designed primarily to enhance ingroup cooperation and cohesion. Seen in this way, there is no need to posit intergroup conflict to explain the emergence of ingroup identification and favoritism.

Some authors have suggested that outgroups automatically activate hostility and conflict (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). The difficulties with this viewpoint are twofold. One is that humans belong to many groups and levels of group within a superordinate group. Some of the group memberships could make an individual his own outgroup member, and automatic hostility to oneself would be very odd. Second, if outgroup hostility is automatic, then humans would be in a perpetual state of hostility, which would induce maladaptive stress responses. Although favoring automatic outgroup hostility, van Vugt and Park (2010) conceded that not every outgroup will be met with hostility, only those who "matter from a tribal perspective" (p. 20), and mattering appears to be a question of whether the outgroup poses a threat.

A meta-analysis of hundreds of studies documented that simple contact reduces intergroup wariness and distrust, contrary to the automatic hostility hypothesis (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Another large meta-analytic review found that intergroup friendships also improve attitudes and reduce anxiety toward outgroups (Davies, Tropp, Aron, Pettigrew, & Wright, 2011), reminiscent of the "mating bridges" theorized by Chapais (2010).

A one-shot third-party punishment experiment with two non-hostile indigenous groups in Papua New Guinea provides additional evidence that intergroup behavior is not automatically hostile (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006). There were three roles that tribe members played. There was a dictator (A), a recipient (B), and a punisher (C). The experiment had four conditions: all three players could be from one tribe (ABC), player A is from

one tribe and B and C were from the other tribe (BC), players A and B are from the same tribe and C is from the other tribe (AB), or players A and C are from one tribe and B is from the other tribe (AC). Some of the results confirmed expected ingroup effects. Punishment was highest when the recipient and the punisher were from the same tribe (ABC and BC), indicating that the punisher is more interested in protecting a member of the same tribe. The BC punishments were higher than ABC, suggesting some leniency when the dictator and punisher are from the same tribe. In the AB condition, the dictator gave more money to the recipient. In an interesting exception to what might be expected in intergroup behavior, low offers from dictators were punished even when the recipient and the punisher were from different tribes (AC and AB). This latter finding suggests that intergroup interactions can be at least somewhat cooperative.

Stürmer and Snyder (2010) reported the results of six studies on ingroup and outgroup helping. Although individuals did help ingroup members more, participants also helped outgroup members when it was rewarding to do so. In addition, the likelihood of helping outgroup members was higher the more similar the groups were. Stürmer and Snyder suggested that people help ingroup members because they see ingroup members' welfare as "an end in itself" (p. 44), but individuals help outgroup members based on a cost/benefit analysis of advantage. Taken together, the research suggests that responses to outgroups are contingent rather than automatic.

Because outgroup negativity and hostility are obviously common, the question is, what activates outgroup negativity? The automatic response toward outgroup members is wariness and distrust rather than overt conflict (Insko et al., 2005). More overt negativity and hostility are likely when ingroup and outgroup interests are incompatible. Rivalry situations have this ingroup/outgroup incompatibility. Whereas seeing an ally experiencing distress tends to elicit empathy (Decety & Ickes, 2009), a rival's difficulties tend to incite pleasure, also known as *schadenfreude* (Leach et al., 2003). Moreover, as Cohen et al. (2006) noted, prohibitions against ingroup aggression may not be activated in intergroup competition or conflict. In fact, aggression may be required in these cases, if group interests are threatened. (See Chapter 9.)

To study intergroup decision making, Morgan and Tindale (2002) used a PDG with three-person groups wherein they asked each person in the group whether he preferred to cooperate or defect prior to a group decision. When all three members initially favored cooperation, the group opted for cooperation 95 percent of the time. When all three initially favored defection, the group defected 100 percent of the time. When two members favored cooperation and one favored defection, they cooperated only 48 percent of the time. In contrast, when two members favored defection and one preferred cooperation, the group defected 91 percent of the time. This suggests that it is easier to decide to defect than to cooperate in an intergroup situation.

That is, it is easier to cheat or exploit an outgroup than cooperate with an outgroup.

In a study of real-world rivalry, Cikara, Botvinick, and Fiske (2011) compared die-hard baseball fans' responses to their team's successes and failures and the rival teams' successes and failures. They created subjectively positive and negative conditions using sports channel screenshots. The positive conditions included their team's successes or the rival team's failures, and the negative conditions consisted of their team's failures or the rival team's successes. Their outcome measures were subjective ratings, and fMRI scans focused on the ventral striatum (VS; associated with receiving rewards) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; associated with receiving punishment and the affective response to pain). Both subjectively positive conditions were rated as pleasurable and activated the VS. The subjectively negative conditions elicited anger and pain responses and activated the ACC. The more anger and pain participants reported, the more likely they were to endorse aggression against rival fans (e.g., heckling, shoving, hitting). Activation of the VS when watching a rival team's failures was also related to the endorsement of aggression against rival fans. Cikara et al. included a contest between non-rival teams as a control condition, and their participants reacted in a neutral manner to these outcomes. Their results indicate that intergroup competition and aggression have a neural substrate that is activated by collective identity in conditions of rivalry. Moreover, aggression was endorsed against rival fans, not the players who actually had the successes, showing that the hostility is impersonally directed toward members of the rival group, not just the individuals who "harmed" one's own group. Leach et al. (2003) reported similar *schadenfreude* among Dutch soccer fans at the elimination of their rival, Germany, in the 1998 World Cup competition.

In summary, the activation of collective identity promotes a priority on group interests over individual interests, ingroup favoritism, and group loyalty. Activating collective identity also elicits wariness and distrust toward outgroups. In situations involving intergroup competition, collective identity elicits hostility and aggression. Collective identity may have more than simple, direct effects on behavior, so it is worth examining potential moderators of the influence of collective identity on behavior.

Moderators of Collective Identity

In a meta-analysis of 48 studies, Wildschut et al. (2003) found two moderators of the collective identity effect on intergroup behavior. The first one confirms that individuals do not become automatically competitive or aggressive with collective identity activation. The difference between responses to individuals and outgroups is more pronounced when the outcomes for the groups are in conflict. The greater the conflict of interest, the more the difference in competitiveness between groups and individuals becomes. However, when the outcomes for the two parties correspond (i.e.,

the best way to get the most is to cooperate), interindividual and intergroup responses are much more similar. This indicates rational responses to contingencies. Group members cooperate with outgroups when it is in their best interest, but the ingroup is prioritized when a conflict of interests appears.

The second moderator is communication. When people participating as individuals in PDGs communicate with each other, cooperation increases. When people participating in PDGs as a group communicate, cooperation increases as well, but less so than in two-person games. This suggests that trust is activated more strongly in person-to-person communication than in group-to-group communication. Wildschut et al. suggested that when groups communicate cooperative intent, it is "less credible and persuasive" than when individuals communicate cooperative intent (p. 715). This is suggestive of intergroup wariness and distrust but not automatic conflict and hostility.

Insko et al. (2005) identified group categorization as a third interesting moderator of the discontinuity. In a PDG study, they had two manipulations. Participants were divided into playing as individuals or as groups, and the individual or group counterpart was identified as belonging to the same group category or a different category based on preferences about paintings. There was a main effect for the group variable, with greater expected cooperation between individuals than between groups. There was also an interaction, indicating that groups expected less cooperation from groups from a different category than from individuals who were from different categories. This suggests that the wariness characteristic of group-to-group interaction can be reduced, but not eliminated, on the basis of commonality between the groups.

These three moderators of the influence of collective identity suggest that this adaptation is attuned to important contextual variations. When the situation involves discordant outcomes for two groups, a competitive approach is more likely. The degree of intergroup cooperation can be increased through communication across groups and by identifying commonalities across groups, but it cannot be eliminated. This suggests sensitivity to variations in the intergroup climate, allowing significant flexibility.

The Evolution of Collective Identity

The extensive evidence for collective identity suggests that it is a universal aspect of human nature, raising the question of its evolutionary origins. Evolutionary scientists have just begun to theorize about and study intergroup behavior, so the evolutionary account of intergroup behavior is somewhat thin at this point. There are two sets of highly suggestive studies, however.

As Heatherton (2010) pointed out, the most significant threats to survival and reproduction come from other humans, in the forms of ingroup threats and outgroup threats. Because humans are a group-living species, secure

membership in a group is central to fitness, and this can be threatened by ostracism. For this reason, early humans evolved the capacity to register signs of social inclusion or exclusion that can motivate the individual to forestall exclusion and maintain inclusion (Chapter 7).

The second major threat to life and reproduction is other human groups as competitors for resources and potentially as aggressors (Alexander, 1987). Van Vugt and Park (2010) suggested that humans have a tribal psychology that is an adaptation to a long history of intense rivalry and competition between groups. Such an adaptation would lead to both strong ingroup attachment and a wariness of outgroups and a willingness to exploit outgroups. This requires rapid social categorization, which cues ingroup favoritism and outgroup wariness. Such a tribal psychology can very simply and effectively manage threats from outgroup members and prime individuals to benefit ingroup members. Each threat detection system has the lock-and-key pattern of special design (Williams, 1966).

Although some theorists see ingroup favoritism as a complex cognitive function (e.g., to manage fear of death; Pyszczynski, Greenburg, & Solomon, 1997), the evidence is more consistent with a simple, automatically activated heuristic, as anticipated by an evolutionary approach (Fiske, 2005). Hammond and Axelrod (2006) conducted a simulation study to assess the plausibility of the evolution of a simple ingroup favoritism heuristic. They created a simple PDG simulation model in which each agent only interacted with another agent once (to remove the possibility of reciprocity). The agents in the simulation had only three traits. The first was the ability to distinguish group membership among four groups. The second trait defined whether the agent cooperated or defected when meeting an ingroup member, and the third trait defined whether the agent cooperated or defected when meeting an outgroup member. The ingroup favoritism strategy—cooperate with ingroup agents and defect with outgroup agents—is one of the four possible strategies. As in all PDGs, the highest payoff is to defect when the other cooperates, with mutual cooperation being the second-best option. Hammond and Axelrod defined reasonable parameters (12 percent reproduction rate, random “choice” of exchange partner for each round, 10 percent mortality rate). Cooperating lowered the reproduction rate by 1 percent, whereas receiving cooperation raised the rate by 3 percent.

They ran the simulation ten times for 2000 iterations and found that 76 percent of agents had the ingroup favoritism strategy, three times the likelihood of chance (25 percent). This occurred without reciprocity and allowing for free riding, both of which lower the payoff for cooperating, so their results are extremely conservative. Cooperation was the dominant strategy (74 percent of “choices”). This was because agents tended to cluster with others of the same group. The simulations had a sequenced pattern in which agents of the same group congregated through migration. Groups with ingroup favoritism (cooperate with ingroup agents, defect with outgroup agents) grow

faster, but free riders take advantage of cooperation within the group. They found that free riders were actually controlled by the ingroup favoritism of the other groups. When a free rider exchanges with an outgroup agent with the ingroup favoritism strategy, both agents defect, to the detriment of the free rider. These findings were very robust, as Hammond and Axelrod found very similar results when they halved and doubled all of the parameters (cost of helping, population size, mutation rate, etc.).

Taking a comparative approach to exploring the evolution of ingroup favoritism, Mahajan et al. (2011) conducted seven studies of free-ranging rhesus macaques in six stable social groups, with a moderate degree of intergroup competition and aggression. They studied whether the monkeys could spontaneously distinguish ingroup and outgroup members and whether these distinctions engaged ingroup favoritism. Mahajan et al. created a visual version of the implicit association test that paired a monkey picture with a positive (fruit) or negative (spider) picture. The test of evaluative attitudes is spending more time viewing inconsistent pairings (e.g., an outgroup member paired with fruit).

Mahajan et al. (2011) reported that male monkeys quickly distinguished the two, even when familiarity was controlled. Remarkably, the effect was still present when the ingroup monkey had very recently joined or left the respondent's social group. They explained the sex difference because primate males manage most intergroup interaction, particularly when it involves conflict and aggression. The most important conclusion of these studies is that with relatively simple cognition and no language, macaques spontaneously discriminated ingroup and outgroup members, and males demonstrated clear ingroup favoritism. Because social categorization is present across primate species, this capacity is quite evolutionarily ancient (macaque and ape lineages diverged 25–30 million years ago). It also suggests that ingroup discrimination is an automatic process whose basic functions are simple and nonlinguistic, although higher cognitive and linguistic processes could augment intergroup judgments and make them more nuanced.

Moll and Tomasello (2007) pointed out that most social species do not need advanced social cognition because most animals' social cognition concerns the proper spatial proximity to conspecifics and perhaps some very simple interactions and roles. Chimpanzees share more complex cognition with humans, including the ability to recognize others as goal-directed actors, but humans evolved unique ways of harnessing that goal orientation in cooperative directions. Moll and Tomasello presented the "Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis," positing that humans are adapted to ingroup cooperation whereas chimpanzee cognition is driven more by ingroup competition.

The differences in social cognition are readily apparent in the area of gaze, which is extremely important in human cooperation. Moll and Tomasello (2007) explained that chimpanzees are unable to use others' gaze direction in cooperative interactions, even when they are highly motivated, such as

in locating hidden food. In competitive situations, however, chimpanzees are very good at recognizing what others can and cannot see. For example, when a subordinate individual can see food that a dominant cannot see, the subordinate will use this knowledge to obtain the food. Chimpanzees do not use gaze in a cooperative way because they continually compete with conspecifics for food.

Moll and Tomasello (2007) explained that although some ape behaviors are broadly cooperative (e.g., grooming and coalition formation), the full measure of cooperation, termed “shared cooperative activities” (Bratman, 1992), requires three features: 1) individuals or groups have a joint goal, 2) participants adopt complementary roles, and 3) participants are willing to assist one another to fulfill their roles. Moll and Tomasello described extensive experimental evidence that chimpanzees do not fulfill any of these criteria. Just to give one example that illustrates the differences across species, Warneken et al. (2006) found that whereas 18- to 24-month-old human infants universally and enthusiastically participate in problem-solving tasks and social games, chimpanzees would only participate in problem solving. In this study, a confederate would participate in the activity for a period of time and then stop participating. The children always attempted to reengage the confederate, but the chimpanzees did not, even when the activity involved obtaining food. This shows that human infants are primed to assist others in fulfilling their roles in cooperation.

There is significant phylogenetic continuity with social categorization and ingroup favoritism, with all primate groups demonstrating these features. Cooperation in primate species varies from the cooperative breeding of tamarins and marmosets (Silk & Boyd, 2010) to a mixture of cooperation (grooming) and competition (food) in chimpanzee ingroups (Moll & Tomasello, 2007). There is even more variability in intergroup interactions. Chimpanzees, bonobos, and gorillas have identifiable ingroups and territories that they maintain. Chimpanzees have perpetually hostile, aggressive, and lethal interactions with outgroups and with ingroup members at times (Wilson & Wrangham, 2003). Bonobos have more relaxed, even friendly relations with outgroups, with no reported aggressive interactions (Wilson & Wrangham). Some monkeys have clearly identified territories and others do not (e.g., capuchins; Robinson, 1988), but they frequently have aggressive encounters characterized by threat, bluff, and retreat behaviors. Clearly, social categorization and differential treatment of ingroup and outgroup members are very ancient in our lineage. Humans are not as intensely, automatically, and lethally aggressive toward outgroup individuals as chimpanzees, but neither do we interact as freely and easily with outgroup members as do bonobos. Laboratory research suggests a default wariness, unless there is resource rivalry, whereupon aggressive interaction is likely. This threshold of rivalry leading to aggression is frequently crossed with human groups, going back to our hunter-gatherer ancestors. (See Chapter 9.)

Brewer (2004) explained that collective identity is vital for humans because the individual's survival and the survival of his offspring depend not just on his own skill and effort but also on others' skill and effort. In the EEA, this centered on small, stable bands. The group-living adaptation made the coordination and cohesion of the group paramount to the fitness of the individual. For this reason, "all of the building blocks of human psychology—cognition, emotion, motivation—have been shaped by the demands of social interdependence" (Brewer, p. 107). The automaticity and strength of social categorization induction is strong evidence for Brewer's claim. The role of the group in fitness has been framed by some as group selection (Boyd & Richerson, 2005; Sober & Wilson, 1998), but this framing is not necessary to recognize the importance of collective identity. Social interdependence can also be seen as a progressive set of individual adaptations that capitalized on the affordances of social life.

The existence of the human macroband or tribe is unique among primates, with its cooperative, ongoing, regularized interactions. In the EEA, macrobands apparently gathered seasonally for brief periods as longer gatherings were not supportable with available resources. These gatherings were necessary for trade, group maintenance, and mate selection. Mate selection is a key requirement for the larger group because between 175 and 475 individuals appear necessary to maintain genetic variability (Caporael, 1997; Hassan, 1981). This connection between mate selection, reproduction, and the maintenance of large group structures through cultural symbols clarifies why Caporael asserted that "although their specifics are wildly variable, humans require customs, artifacts, and so forth for survival and reproduction" (p. 280). In other words, culture is centrally important to human survival because it provides the shared mores and bases for social categorization that constitute the links between bands, and these links facilitated a sufficiently large in-group for reproductive success.

Homo evolved a pair bonding form of mating that diverged from the chimpanzee and bonobo pattern. In *Pan*, females independently transfer to non-natal groups for mating purposes. The establishment of pair bonded relationships required a peaceful gathering of bands where potential mates could be identified and pair relationships arranged. This kinship through cultural symbols and the biological intergroup kinship through intermarriage (Chapter 7) would have been mutually reinforcing.

Brewer (2008b) pointed out that interpersonal relationships (dyadic, work group, and band) and large collectives (macroband) serve different adaptive functions and therefore have distinct evolutionary sources and functions. Interpersonal relationships can support security needs and the day-to-day divisions of labor that characterize small human groups. Large collectives provide access to a much larger but more intermittently available resources, including knowledge, trade, mates, and protection from marauding groups. The importance of collective identity is evident in universal practices such

as telling origin stories that explain how a particular people came into the world and what their role is in that world. The macroband level of human sociality makes it possible to sustain elaborate cooperative activities over an extended period of time. It undergirds the possibility of collective practices involving money, social institutions like government, marriage, and corporations, and cumulative cultural development. The simulation and primate studies of social categorization, collective identity, and ingroup favoritism have provided evidence of the plausible evolutionary origins of these heuristics, making a foray into the possible neurophysiological substrates worthwhile.

The Neurophysiology of Intergroup Relations

One aspect of the neurophysiology of ingroup favoritism, group benefitting, and loyalty could be the neuropeptide oxytocin. De Dreu et al. (2010) investigated whether oxytocin is involved in regulating ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility in three studies using between-group PDGs. Compared to controls, participants who received an intranasal administration of oxytocin were more cooperative with their ingroup and experienced greater ingroup trust but did not have more elevated hostility or distrust toward the outgroup. De Dreu et al. reported that recipients of oxytocin were less cooperative with the outgroup when the investigators elevated fear of the outgroup but not when the experimental condition favored greedy exploitation of the outgroup. They interpreted these results in terms of oxytocin promoting greater protection of the ingroup. Respondents reported that they intended their non-cooperation was meant to protect their ingroup from defection by the outgroup.

De Dreu, Greer, Van Kleef, Shalvi, and Handgraaf (2011) examined ingroup favoritism in five more studies employing the intranasal oxytocin administration, the Implicit Association Test, the attribution of secondary emotions, and a trolley car dilemma. They tested their hypotheses with an outgroup that was relatively similar to their Dutch participants (Germans) and relatively dissimilar (Arabs). Oxytocin administration increased ingroup favoritism but not outgroup derogation or aggression for either outgroup. The results were insensitive to powerful moderators such as ethnic group (dis)similarity and outgroup saliency, suggesting an automatic response tendency toward ingroup favoritism. Van IJzendoorn and Bakermans-Kranenburg (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of 23 studies and found a moderate strong, positive effect for oxytocin on ingroup trust. Their results also failed to support the hypothesis that oxytocin is associated with outgroup (dis)trust, suggesting that outgroup hostility is associated with a different circuitry than ingroup favoritism.

Zak, Kurzban, and Matzner (2005) complemented this research by examining whether trustworthiness cues increased serum oxytocin. They used

a trust or investment game (participant A assigns money to participant B, the experimenter triples the money assigned to B, and B decides how much money to return to participant A). They found that participant B's oxytocin levels were positively correlated with the amount of money he transferred back to A. This effect did not occur in a control condition wherein B knew that the amount of money transferred to participant A was randomly determined. Zak et al. concluded that when trustworthiness cues are present, oxytocin release is associated with trustworthy behavior.

Recognizing outgroup threats is essential for activating self-protective behavior to prevent exploitation by outgroup members. The most commonly identified brain region for detecting outgroup threat is the amygdala, which plays a central role in responding to fear-related stimuli (Amodio, 2011). Unfamiliar faces evoke stronger responses in the amygdala than familiar faces, suggesting that it may function as a kind of "social brake" with strangers. This effect has been documented in normal volunteers, in its absence in individuals with lesions in the amygdala, and in experiments with macaques, suggesting an automatic wariness toward strangers (Gobini, 2011).

Cikara et al.'s (2011) study of baseball fans indicated clearly separate activations in rivalry situations for ingroup and outgroup success. Ingroup success and rival outgroup failure activated the reward center of the ventral striatum, whereas ingroup failure and rival outgroup success activated the pain center of the anterior cingulate cortex. Rival outgroup success and ingroup failure also prompted aggressive responses in die-hard baseball fans. Neurophysiological research is consistent with the social psychology of intergroup relations, but it is just beginning to clarify the neurophysiology associated with ingroups and outgroups. This is a promising start, but there is much that remains to be learned.

The Malleability of Collective Identity and Group Membership

One interpretation of collective identity is that humans are subject to a tribal instinct that controls our behavior when collective identity is activated. There are good reasons to be wary of this simple deterministic interpretation, however. The first is that collective identity is constructed, not given in the same way that infant birds imprint on their caregiver. As Brewer and Yuki (2007) put it, "although the capacity for social identity is postulated to be universal, the locus and content of social identities are clearly culturally defined and regulated" (p. 307). That is, normally developing humans have a collective identity, but the shape of that identity is clearly open to interpretation. There are myriad group and relationship configurations, a wide variety of symbolically represented collective identities, and great diversity in group norms. The specific configurations, meanings, and practices that define any set of relationships and groups get worked out through history

and culture and are responsive to physical and intercultural circumstances (e.g., resource availability and interactions with neighboring groups).

The largest evolutionary grouping, the macroband, is formed and maintained in a symbolic, cultural medium. Cultures are comprised of collectively shared meanings and practices that change in response to reinterpretations of the internal and external environments. Humans regularly transform their cultural inheritance in response to challenges to the resources of that meaning system, to innovations within the culture, and through ongoing interactions with other groups, meaning that these shared understandings are dynamic over time. In the modern West, for example, key cultural understandings about individuals having inner depths and a self, the developmental stage of adolescence, and the combination of romantic love and marriage are relatively recent innovations. These cultural interpretations of what it is to be a person in our social world are pervasive and strongly shape many human activities (Bellah et al., 1985; Richardson et al., 1999; Taylor, 1989).

Because cultural meaning systems are central to individual and collective identity, human social interaction and organization cannot be reduced to a set of causal forces or to individual or genetic explanations. As Taylor (1985) argued, there is no pre-given independent structure for shared identity; it has to be co-constructed by the members of the group. Thus, there is a circularity to individual and collective identity. An individual's identity is made up of characteristic actions, and individual actions are shaped by interpretations of cultural norms. These cultural norms are interpretations of what is required in particular situations. Social norms must be interpreted because they are complex and responsive to changing circumstances. Because humans create and modify the norms that guide our actions, we are self-interpreting creatures. These interpretations are not just descriptions of something that exists independently. Rather, the description of a specific form of shared identity, say, democratic citizenship, can only exist because a group shares that interpretation. That is, the interpretation helps to constitute that identity and its associated activities. Although it is human nature to live in groups, human groups are constituted by group members' interpretations of what the group is and how it should live.

From Chapter 5 up to this point, we have seen that human nature dictates that we imitate, cooperate, conform to social norms, and have collective identities. Yet human nature does not determine the content of our imitation, cooperation, conformity, or collective identities. This makes it necessary for human groups to interpret what it means to be a group and to be a group member. Therefore, belonging and shared identity are open-ended because they can be realized in a great variety of ways, along with the mores that define the group. This means that humans have considerable latitude in working out a specific form of collective identity. All this gets worked out over time by communities of people who care very much about that content and maintain it through practices and traditions.

The second reason that social identification is not simply a deterministic instinct is that human beings can reinterpret the basis of group constitution. Individuals migrate from one group to the other, and these individuals become members of the new group. In the EEA, this was a necessity, at the very least for mating purposes. We also saw that the tendency to incorporate new group members into the collective identity is extremely ancient, as evidenced by group incorporation of new members among macaques (Mahajan et al., 2011). The symbolic identifiers of human ingroup members change as well. Clothing is an important symbolic identifier that continually changes, the surprising economic and social power of which we see today in fashions and designer logos.

Third, humans belong to multiple groups (working groups, bands, and macrobands), and many of these group memberships are not mutually exclusive. This means that the *relevant* group membership must be recognized to guide ingroup/outgroup actions. This flexibility in group definition makes it possible for any given individual to demonstrate favoritism toward a wide variety of ingroups. Recall that intergroup contact, friendship, and reciprocity can overcome outgroup wariness as well.

Fourth, although personal attachments and group membership are integral to one's self-concept, self-interest and group-interest do not always coincide. Therefore, it is important for individuals and groups to have ways to deal with this important motivational tension. Sometimes this tension is easily resolved in favor of the most salient identity. At other times, this tension requires humans to reflect and deliberate about what is most important in a given situation. Such questions pertaining to the human good and to the ethics of interpersonal and intergroup relations are unavoidable for self-aware, ultrasocial beings. Some of our responses will be quick and automatic, but we are also capable of working these questions out deliberately because our cognitive architecture does not always provide automatic and clear answers. The presence of difficult conflicts between individual and group interests adds to the ample evidence that human action cannot be adequately explained by the extremely common but erroneous view that egoistic interests are the ultimate truth of human motivation.

The emerging construal of human evolution emphasizes that sociality is central to human nature, and this sociality is expressed at multiple levels and in a nearly infinite variety of ways. Although sociality is unquestionably a defining feature of humanity, it does not lend itself to a deterministic or reductionistic reading. Sociality is an open-ended characteristic because there is no singular mode of human social intercourse. The particular forms that social interactions take, the practices that characterize different groups, the roles various individuals play, and the ways that these functions are carried out across groups are highly variable. All of this emerges from the ongoing interpretations of historical communities.

Group Membership and Shared Identity

Human sociality is nowhere clearer than in the importance of the extended self and group membership. Brewer and her colleagues' (e.g., Brewer & Caporael, 2006) concept of the expanded self reinforces the centrality of group belonging for human beings. Belonging is a key human good in our group affiliations and identity. Belonging to a particular group among others is supported by strong, rapid, and automatic social categorization, through which individuals identify ingroup and outgroup members. Categorization activates ingroup and outgroup responses. This clarifies that the fully separate individual is an abstraction inasmuch as belonging to groups is necessary for human identity, rather than being an add-on to an already complete person. Our membership in particular groups tells us who we are and what is important in life; it helps to define our identity. The term "expanded self" is apt because group membership expands the person through collective identity. Social categorization is extremely ancient (at least 25 million years old) and is therefore automatic, simple, and pre-linguistic.

Social categorization activates collective identity, which inclines the person to identify with the group and to see the group's interests as his interests. Recognizing others as ingroup members evokes trust, cooperation, sacrifice, and loyalty. The merging of individual and group interests elicits ingroup favoritism, even when acting on behalf of the group is costly to the individual.

We can also see the depth and importance of collective identity through recognizing that the meaning of self-interest shifts depending on whether one's individual or collective identity is active. When the individual identity is active, a person primarily pursues his individual interests. When the collective identity is active, the shared interests of the group become paramount in perceptions, choices, and behavior. In this situation, the group's interest *is* the individual's interest. This suggests that the well-worn dichotomy of egoism and altruism misses the central point that the interests of the individual and the group are frequently inseparable. Because of the ongoing fluidity of self-other boundaries—seen in imitation, cooperation, and justice—situations with this kind of merging are abundant in human affairs. It turns out that group identity is extraordinarily easy to induce and occurs quickly with only minimal cues that indicate similarity even among strangers.

Social categorization also evokes wariness toward outgroup members, including a less cooperative and trusting response. If one's group interests are threatened by another group, hostility and aggression are likely responses. Along with attachment and social norms, these processes create a shared identity that powerfully influences our thoughts, emotions, and actions.

The Natural Good of Shared Identity

In this section, I discuss how the evolved human function of collective identity gives rise to the good of shared identity. I argue that shared identity is the excellent expression of collective identity, encompassing not only joint group membership but also communal pursuits with others.

Is shared identity a natural good? Recall that the function argument states that a creature's good is found in the excellent enactment of its natural functions. Because there is ample evidence for the proposition that collective identity is a natural function, we must consider whether it is plausible that there are better and worse forms of collective identity. The best kind of collective identity would seem to include the individual having a clearly acknowledged membership in a group, an understanding of how to participate in the group well, active participation, a strong sense of fellowship with other group members, shared intentionality with other group members regarding what is important and how to pursue the group's goals, and a wholehearted endorsement of those goals. Unsurprisingly, this set of characteristics seems to describe a socially integrated, coherent life, one that has many important elements of what it means to flourish as a human being. When I act on the basis of a clearly shared identity, my good becomes largely inseparable from the good of my group. Shared identity is just as much about being a good member of the group as it is about flourishing as an individual, meaning that contributions to the welfare of the collective are as important as my individual welfare.

The life I have just described would have been eminently possible as a Paleolithic forager but often seems out of reach in our modern world. This is just what we would expect, given that we did not evolve to live in extremely large, highly complex, deeply interconnected, technologically accelerated megacities.

In the *Politics*, Aristotle (1996) argued that contributing to the overall good of one's community is the most important good in practical life. The term he used for these activities is *koinonia*, which is translated as "good fellowship" or "communion" (1295b 23). The key meanings of this term include participation, partnership, contributory help, and sharing in an endeavor (Strong, 1979). Today, communion most commonly refers to Christian understandings of the bond among co-religionists or a sacrament, but Aristotle understood communion more broadly, including relationship partners, friends, business partners, and civic partners, thereby encompassing political, intellectual, artistic, athletic, and other communal endeavors. Our shared identity makes it possible to commune, as we partner in and contribute to the shared pursuit of what we see as choiceworthy endeavors. Shared identity, the excellent expression of collective identity, expands a person's capacities because, as Cooper (1980) so eloquently put it, "only by merging one's activity and interests with those of others can the inherent fragility of any human being's interests be overcome" (p. 329). The expanded self gives scope, continuity, meaning, and

staying power for our activities, all of which are essential to the goodness of those activities. Shared identity reinforces the choiceworthiness of collective human activity in a way that is more thorough and powerful than activities undertaken by a putatively autonomous individual. In the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle (1952) magnified this point by saying that “for us [humans] well-being has reference to something other than ourselves, but in his [God’s] case he is himself his own well-being” (1245b 18–19), clarifying the hubris of seeing any human individual as sufficient in himself.

It is not hard to see how one can fare poorly in collective identity. The simplest way is that one’s collective identity is in doubt, either through marginalization or expulsion from a group or disaffection with the group. One could also find oneself a member of multiple groups that are incompatible with each other, creating ongoing conflicts. The requirements of group membership and participation can be vague, confusing, or conflicting, making it difficult to coordinate one’s actions with others. Or, one could be inadequately equipped to participate in the group’s activities. It could be difficult to attain shared intentionality in the group because of confusion or lack of clarity about the group’s aims. Factionalization, competition, or alienation within groups can undermine any sense of collective aims. Finally, one can be a fully acknowledged, participating member who has clarity about the group’s goals but finds those goals problematic in some way and is unable to endorse them. This capacity for shared identity appears to be universal in humans, but its instantiation remains uncertain, changeable through time, and locally defined. This creates an open-endedness that can also heighten conflict and confusion. The more any of these difficulties become actual, the worse the condition of one’s collective identity. At its worst, one can experience isolation, alienation, ostracism, and anomie, which clarifies that poor quality collective identity is a form of languishing. I reviewed the profound psychological and physical costs of lacking belonging in Chapter 7.

An intriguing set of studies on shared identity sheds further light on its relationship with human flourishing. Reicher and Haslam (2010) made an important distinction between physical groups (sets of people who are physically together) and psychological groups (sets of people who have a shared identity or “we-ness”). Psychological groups are characterized by the spontaneous processes of ingroups, such as mutual support, mutual aid, positive affect, and shared intentionality. People in these groups coordinate their actions to pursue common goals, recalling Tomasello et al.’s (2005) shared intentionality and Aristotle’s (1996) communion. These common goals express the group’s identity, and the group’s goal pursuit expresses its norms and values. Reicher and Haslam called success in reshaping social reality in terms of the group’s ideals “collective self-realization.” When this is achieved, there is an upsurge in well-being for the individuals and the group. Collective self-realization provides the individual with a clear and coherent place in the world, thereby increasing well-being. If collective self-realization

does not occur, Reicher and Haslam suggested that social identification will be attenuated, followed by weakened social identification and reduced individual well-being.

Psychological group membership or belonging is one important benefit of religious practices (e.g., Powell, Bering, & Thoresen, 2003) and is stress buffering in difficult occupations (e.g., Haslam, O'Brien, Jetten, Vormedal, & Penna, 2005). For example, Tewari, Khan, Hopkins, Srinivasan, and Reicher (2012) studied Hindu participants in the Magh Mela, a one-month long mass pilgrimage to the Ganges and Yamuna river confluence in which millions of people participate each year. The Magh Mela is crowded and noisy, has poor living conditions, and takes place when it is cold. In spite of these conditions, pilgrims experienced increases in their psychological well-being and physical health compared to controls who did not participate. Tewari et al. attributed these differences to the benefits of participating in a mass event that was based in psychological group membership or, in my terms, shared identity.

The studies I have cited here provide intriguing suggestions about what I am calling the good of shared identity. Empirical evidence for this human good remains somewhat thin, so additional research on the relationships between shared identity and human flourishing are still needed. Nevertheless, collective identity is clearly an important feature of human nature, and if shared identity is the good that is the fulfillment of collective identity processes, as I have argued, then it is an extremely important aspect of the good life. I now consider whether shared identity has the structure of a constitutive and shared good.

Shared Identity as a Constitutive Good

It is obvious that collective identity is not merely an affiliative tie between an otherwise independent individual and a set of other individuals, nor is it simply a strategy individuals use to obtain fitness benefits. Rather, humans were designed to have collective identities, which are underwritten by a set of ingroup processes that partly constitute the individual's identity. Collective identity is not one option among many to obtain resources; it is a part of our makeup as human beings because individuals require a collective identity, without which we are incomplete. Because individuals cannot stand apart from all collective identities and choose those that are most efficient to achieve ends that are separable from their group memberships, the good of collective identity, shared identity, cannot be an instrumental good. Shared identity cannot be pursued by any available means, only through the practices of collective identity.

Aristotle provocatively stated that the state or group is prior to the individual and that the individual belongs to the state rather than the other way around. This reverses the prevalent modern assumption that the individual is the ultimate social reality. Aristotle's point was that individuals can only become full-fledged human beings by being part of a group and that one's

identity is crucially constituted by one's group membership(s). From this perspective, belonging and shared identity are goods that are constitutive elements in being fully human. As Cacioppo and Patrick (2008) so compellingly argued, the experience of loneliness, which involves being cut off from shared identity, is one of the most powerful risk factors for psychological and physical languishing. Having an acknowledged shared identity with others is an important contributor to human flourishing.

It is important to recognize that the good of shared identity is itself a constitutive end as well. One could construe collective identity instrumentally as an outcome that individuals pursue through various strategies. For example, one could think of identifying with a professional association instrumentally. To become a member, one obtains the proper training, applies for membership, pays dues, attends meetings, and adheres to the standards and rules of the association. In this example, collective identity consists of being listed as a member and of being able to hold oneself out as a member. The instrumental view of collective identity trivializes it because it portrays shared identity only as an outcome to be obtained, as if group membership is nothing more than having one's name on a membership list and obtaining some privileges. All of the action is in the strategies one undertakes on the way to obtaining the identification. The activities of collective identity have no role to play except as a tool. Seeing collective identity instrumentally renders it very weak and impoverished because it is more a possession than an active aspect of who one is. Such a weak form of collective identity does not rise to the level of shared identity.

In contrast, a constitutive understanding of shared identity clarifies that the identification actually consists in the activities of group membership. It is through participating in the group that one actually identifies with it. In other words, acting as a member of the group is what constitutes shared identity. The more deeply one is involved in the activities of the group, the more thoroughly one identifies with it. This makes membership more fully part of the tangible, observable world rather than being a mere personal perception because there is no separation between the activities of membership and identifying with the group. The actions of induction into the group are not simply strategies or steps toward qualifying as a member. Instead, they are the way one turns oneself into a member. One's activities and identity as a member of the group are also partly constituted by the recognition of other group members. More concretely, getting training to become, say, a psychologist is not just qualifying to be called a psychologist, it is learning to think and act in the way that psychologists do. The training is transformative, a development of an identity as a psychologist. The work of a psychologist is not simply a perquisite that one obtains by virtue of training; it is what constitutes one as a psychologist. The same is true of becoming a biologist, a hobbyist, or a citizen; one is constituted as such by the activities that amount to being such and by others' recognition of that identity.

Belonging as a Shared Good

It takes little argument to establish that shared identity is a shared good. It is virtually tautological because shared identity is not possible without the ongoing participation of other people who also share the identification as group members. Shared identity can only be attained mutually. It is mutually recognizable through the display of actions, practices, language, symbols, clothing, certification, and so forth. Ultimately, it is this mutual recognition that constitutes one as having the shared identification. One could have all of the qualifications and accoutrements of a group member but would not be identified as such without others' recognition. Although this point is obvious, it must be stated explicitly to overcome the powerful predilection among psychologists and Westerners in general to interpret social phenomena in individualistic terms. Accordingly, the concept of shared identity further undermines individualism because shared identity is so important to humans and it cannot be reduced to individual experience and action.

A Fly in the Ointment

The astute reader will no doubt have noticed a significant issue with shared identity. Shared identity clearly applies to many salutary group memberships, such as educational institutions, memberships in religious congregations, participation in the Magh Mela or in a civil rights movement. Yet it seems possible to attain shared identity in fascist organizations, street gangs, or terrorist groups. Of course, I would like to reserve the good of shared identity for the positive involvements that people have and consider less constructive group memberships as problematic manifestations of collective identity. In this way, I could explain the power of memberships in unsavory groups as an outgrowth of the human need for collective identity. Yet, to make this move, I have to show how to adjudicate among better and worse forms of collective identity. For many social scientists, this would violate the fact/value distinction. Indeed, attempting to avoid the entanglement with moral judgment is why many social scientists would rather not discuss goods of any kind. The central thesis of this book is that the human good can be recognized in the excellent expression of our nature. Therefore, I strongly reject this attempt at moral neutrality.

One way to recognize better and worse shared identities is provided by the liberal political system that assigns rights and dignity to individuals and upholds a system that is neutral about the ends that individuals and groups seek but protects basic rights through neutral justice procedures. There is much to recommend this system, particularly in large, complex modern societies, but there are also many problems and critics of this approach (e.g., MacIntyre, 1981; Sandel, 1996). Crucially, the systematic neutrality about goods in liberal political systems is incompatible with an Aristotelian ethics that must be committed to substantive goods.

Another alternative is suggested by the line of argument I have followed here, but I can only just sketch it at the end of this chapter, partly due to space constraints and partly because it is not yet fully worked out. One of the rather unique aspects of collective identity for humans is that we can be members of many different groups simultaneously with many different modes of belonging. Sometimes the groups can be quite distinct, as in membership in a clan and a profession. At other times, the memberships are nested, as in being a member of a department in a college in a university in a state higher education system. This means that rarely, if ever, is an individual a member of only one group with undivided loyalty. The single-minded, absolute form of commitment to a single group is a central characteristic of cult activity, suggesting that the absolute commitment to a single group might be one criterion for recognizing when collective identity has gone wrong. More commonly, individuals have multiple group loyalties, providing one way to avoid problematic collective identity. The effort to do justice to all of one's commitments and loyalties justice can be challenging, but it can also help us to prevent the kind of single-mindedness that exalts one group's interests so much that damage to others' welfare appears acceptable. When we recognize that the members of any given group are collectively likely to be members of many other groups, a much broader recognition of the welfare of the group of groups that make up a society is more likely.

In other cases, our group memberships are nested, as in being a resident of a city within a county within a state within a region within a nation. It is possible for an individual to identify with any level of these nested memberships, and the group level at which one identifies changes the composition of the ingroups and outgroups, thereby altering the collective identity and its good. Humans evolved to be members of macrobands, and the size and scope of our social groups have expanded enormously in our time. This movement toward greater inclusion and expansion of the social world facilitates trade, information exchange, and cumulative culture that differentiates humans from our primate cousins.

Research suggests that ingroup and outgroup relations are not set in stone. Group inclusion, superordinate group membership, intergroup interaction, perceived similarity, and cost/benefit analysis can and do facilitate positive intergroup interactions. All of these options for improving intergroup relations are volitionally available to us and can be utilized to increase cooperation and decrease hostility.

As human groups have continued to expand in size, the scale of our activities has expanded, often making pursuits and achievements possible that were previously unimaginable, such as knowledge pursuit made possible by large-scale funding, pooling international scientific talent, the creation of the Internet, or the large-scale markets that have created unprecedented affluence. None of these developments are unproblematic, but I think it is clear that there is often a great deal of good that can come of broader

inclusion. This is the central insight of the most persuasive forms of multicultural thought. The collective benefit of including many perspectives and traditions is that it provides greater flexibility and more possibilities for the inclusive group than for more homogenous groups. This suggests a second potential criterion for the best kind of shared identity, which would be approaching group memberships in a more inclusive than exclusive manner.

These two possible criteria for evaluating the value of collective identity barely scratch the surface, and there are surely other useful criteria. The key point here is that we can choose how to construe our group memberships. Some construals will be better than others, and we may need to reflect from time to time on which ways of seeing our group commitments are best. In general, it seems that we can take a page from our ancestors by being inclined to greater inclusion and cooperation, as this seems to generate positive outcomes in general. We moderns have already expanded our inclusiveness in ways that were unimaginable in previous centuries, let alone to our hunter-gatherer ancestors. One plausible heuristic is to include and cooperate where possible, live and let live when cooperation is not possible, and engage in rivalry and aggression only when it is completely unavoidable. I discuss the evolution and costs of intergroup aggression in the next chapter.